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Introduction.

The genesis of this article was John Reeves' s and Matthew Thompson's well-received paper from the 49th Annual Oil and Gas Institute,
"Significant Cases Governing the Onshore Operating Agreement," 1
which sought to collect cases that have interpreted the language of
the model form operating agreements. The suggestion of the program
chairs was that this article might do a similar analysis of farmout
agreements.
Ultimately, however, it became clear that a collection of cases
prepared in the same way as the Reeves and Thompson article was
not feasible because there are no model form farmout agreements.
While farmout agreements tend to share common structures, they do
not use standard language. Therefore, farmout agreements do not lend
themselves easily to the same kind of structured, clause-by-clause
analysis, that can be done on operating agreements.
Farmout agreements do present, however, frequent and recurring
drafting problems. Some of those have been discussed in earlier
papers. 2 But cases decided since these earlier works throw new light
on those problems, as well as illustrate some that were not discussed.
These cases and the problems they illustrate will be the focus of this
article.
This compilation is subject to several limitations. First, the initial
research was done in October 1998, so that later-repo1ted cases may
not be included. Second, in the interest of brevity cases that did not
appear interesting have been discarded. Third, only those cases that
arose in the context of farmout agreements are addressed. 3 Fourth ,
it is inevitable that this article will omit 4 or misstate a case that
l 4911z Oil and Gas Inst. 2-1 (Matthew Bender 1998).
2 Lowe, "Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 41 Southwestern L.J. 759 (1987),
reprinted at 25 Pub. Land & Res . Dig. 5 (1988) (hereinafter referred to as "SMU"); Lowe, "The
Meaning of 'Payout' in Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 10th Eastem Min. L. Inst. 13-1
(Matthew Bender 1989).
3 Nonetheless, this article started with more than 200 cases , and well over 300 cases were
reviewed in the course of writing this article. Many disputes arise in the context of farmout
agreements.
4 It is very easy to overlook conditional-assignment or term-assignment farmouts in legal
research, because those instruments and the disputes that arise from them may not even use
the term "farmout." See, e.g., Riley v. Meriwether, 780 S.W .2d 919, Ill 0 . & G.R. 336 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989), writ denied, discussed below.
(Mallhcw Bender & Co., Inc.)

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2802340

3-3

FARMOUT AGREEMENTS LITIGATION

§ 3.02[1]

someone thinks is important. Finally, since this article is case-oriented,
it is not necessarily cohesive. For those looking for a quick overview
of developments in fannout agreement litigation over the past decade,
however, this analysis is offered as a place to begin.
§ 3.02.

Contract Formation and Interpretation.

Parties often negotiate farmout agreements orally or through an
exchange of letters. Indeed, farmout agreements are often entered into
in the form of and referred to as "letter agreements." 5 As discussed
elsewhere, disputes often arise over whether the parties have formed
a binding contract. s Even when the parties agree that there is a
contract, there is often dispute about what are the terms of the
agreement.

[1]

The Statute of Frauds.

The statute of frauds is a potent barrier to claims that a contract
has been formed or that it means something other than what it says. 7
Several cases from several jurisdictions in the last ten years have
turned on the statute's requirement of a writing. 8 In Petrocana Inc.
v. Margo, 9 the court relied upon the statute of frauds to bar parol
evidence of a verbal agreement to extend the time for exercise of an
area of mutual interest provision in a farmout agreement. 10 In Keesun
Partners v. Ferdig Oil Company, Inc., u the Montana Supreme Court
5 See, e.g., Petrocana v. Margo, 577 So. 2d 274, 11.5 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991).
Agreements other than farmouts may also be called "letter agreements," however. See, e.g.,
Raydon Exploration, Inc. v. Ladd, 902 F.2d 1496, 109 0 . & G.R. 70 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing
a dispute involving a "farmout agreement" and a "letter agreement"), and Billingsley v. Bach
Energy Corporation, 588 So. 2d 786, 118 0. & G.R. 70 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) ("letter
agreement" used to describe an agreement to pay a finders fee).
6
Sec SMU, N. 2 supra at 782-783. See generally Trower, "Enforceability of Letters of Intent
and Other Prclimina1y Agreements," 24 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 347 ( l 978) (discussing whether
parties have formed binding contract or have merely engaged in preliminary negotiations).
7 As discussed in SMU, N. 2 supra at 785, most states classify farmout agreements as interests
in land, subject to the statute of frauds, whether the interest created by an oil and gas lease
is viewed as an estate in land or as a profit a prendre and whether the form of the contract
is bilateral or unilateral.
8 Compliance with the statute of frauds docs not require a formal contract. Compliance occurs
if there is "some memorandum or note thereof . . . in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith" or that party's agent. 8 Stat. 405. § 4.24 Car. 2, ch. 3 § 4 (Eng.); Lynch
v. Davis, 181 Conn. 434, 435 A.2d 977, 980 (l 980).
9 577 So. 2d 274, 115 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1991).
lO 577 Su. 2d at 278.
11 249 Mont. 331, 816 P.2d 417 (1991).
(Mntthcw Bc111.kr & Co.. Inc.)
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upheld a summary judgment, based on the statute of frauds, rejecting
a claim that Ferdig had farmed out to Keesun in reliance on oral
representations that Keesun would enter into a long-tenn gas processing contract with Ferdig.12 Similarly, in B & A Pipeline Co. v.
Dorney, 13 the Fifth Circuit held that a farmor had not partially
performed an allegedly oral gas contract so as to avoid the statute,
where the farmor had chosen to market his gas through the farmee
but retained the right to take production in kind. 14 In Crowder v. Tri-C
Resources, Inc., 15 the statute of frauds barred enforcement of a
supplemental area of mutual interest agreement to farmed-out acreage. 16 The supplemental agreement was referred to in a letter signed
by the party to be charged with its burden and an outline of the affected
land was drawn on a plat, but the party to be charged did not sign
the plat, the plat did not refer to the letter, and the letter neither referred
to the plat nor described the land . 17 In Texaco Inc. v. Mercury
Exploration Co., 18 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied North
Dakota law to conclude that the time for performance of a written
farmout agreement had been not been extended orally .19 Although the
farmout agreement specifically provided that modifications were to
be in writing, North Dakota statutory law permits waiver of a writing
requirement and allows oral modification where "the party performing
has incurred a detriment which he was not obligated by the original
contract to incur."20 The court refused to apply the doctrine because
Mercury gave up no legal rights, incmTed no detriment, and did not
12 The trial court had held that "there is nothing before the Court that would talce the contract
between the parties, if there were one, out of the statute of frauds." 816 P.2d at 420. The supreme
court did not reach the statute of frauds issue, because it found that the parties had nol reached
mutual assent on all essential terms of the contract. Id. at 422-423.
13 904 F.2d 996, 112 0. & G.R. 103 (5th Cir. 1990).
14 904 F.2d at 999-1000.
15 821 S.W.2d 393, 118 0. & G.R. 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991).
16 821 S.W.2d at 396--397.
17 Ibid.

18 994 F.2d

463, 124 0. & G.R. 70 (8th Cir. 1993). Professor Anderson commented on the
case al 124 0. & G.R. 76.
19 Texaco and Mercury entered into a farmout agreement under which Mercury was to drill
three wells before December 31, 1990. 994 F.2d at 464. Mercury failed to complete the wells
before the deadline, and refused to pay the $150,000 in liquidated damages provided by the
agreement. Id. at 465. Mercury asserted as a defense that Texaco had orally agreed to an extension
of time for pcrfonnance.. The federal district court granted Texaco summary judgment. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affinned, exploring in its opinion the doctrine of the "executed oral
agreement."
20 994 F.2d at 465, citing N.D. Cent. Code § 9--09--06 (1987).
(Mallhcw Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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change its position. 21 It also found no evidence that Texaco should
have been equitably estopped to assert the writing requirement. 22
Authority of an agent is another aspect of the statute of frauds.23
In In re Manville Forest Products Corporation, 24 the court app lied
the statute's requirement that a corporate employee have expr:ess,
written authority to bind the corporation in transaction involving real
propertyzs to find a written farmout agreement not binding.26 The
court also refused to apply the apparent authority doctrine, 27 findi11g
that the doctrine does not extend to real estate transactions . 28
What each of these cases underscores is that fundamentals count.
While a contract may be in formal and conci ·e, a' lawyered" agreement
is more likely to be enforceable and to avoid dispute. These cases
illusn·ate the importance of putting agreements in writing with c.lear
drafting (and the clear thinking that i the prerequisite to clear
drafting). That is what lawyers are _paid to do.29

[2]

The Role of Equity in Farmout Agreements.

In limited circumstances, equity may offer protection to the parties
to a farmout-based dispute. The number and diversity of the cases that
the urvey conducted in preparing this article turned up wa urpnsing,
though in retrospect it should not have been. The informality with
which far.mout agreements are often approached by industry pruties
guarantee that claims for equity will be made frequently, and
occasionaUy granted.
Equity may offer limited protection to one who fails to make a
binding agreement. In Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A.,
21 994
22 994
23 See

F.2d at 465.
F.2d at 466.
the disc ussion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 785. See also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann .
§ 26.01 (West 1998).
2 4 89 D.R. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) , applying Louisinnn law.
25 La. Civ. Code. Ann. mt. 2996, 2997.
26 89 B.R. at 365. The employee had wrliren n.nd recorded amhorily to dcnl with up lo 1,000
ncres, but the farmout in question covered 3.360 acres. Ibid.
27 Apparent authority is "[S]uch nulhority as a principle i rHenLionully or by want of ordinary
care cnuses or allows third person to believe tbnt ngenl possesses." JJ/m:k'.1· Law Dic1iom11y 96
(6th ed. 1990); see oho Seavey, Ham/book 0/1//11 Law of Agen1;y § 8(0) (1964) (similnr definition
of npporent nulhority) .
28 89 B.R. nl 366-368.
29 See MU, N. 2 supra nl 783- 784. See also the discussion at Lowe, "Developments in
Nonrugulntory Oil and Gas Lnw: Arc Wu Moving Toward a Kinder and Ge ntler Law of
Cont mets'?," 4211d Oil & Gus J11st. § l.02[nJ (Mau hew Sender 1991 ).
(Mauhcw Bentler & Co., lnc.)
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Inc., Jo the Texas Supreme Court granted quantum merujr reLief to a
would-be farmee who provided seismic infon11atioo in Lh cour e of
unsuccessful negotiations. Vortt proposed rhal Chevron farm out
interests to him, but Chevron refused. Vortt then proposed an operating
agreement. 31 Chevron indicated that it rni gh t be interes e d, and
negotiations extended over four years, during which time Voitt gave
Chevron confidential seismic erv ices, graphics, and map. t expla in
his theory of the property. Instead of finalizing an operating agreement
with Vortt, however, Chevron drilled its own well at the lo at ion
identified by Vortt, and then sued Vortt, claiming that his leases were
invalid. Vortt counterclaimed, seeking quantum mentit. The court of
appeals reversed an award for Vortt because the jury had made no
finding that Vortt furnished the information to Chevron so as to
"reasonabJy notify Chevron that Vortt expected to be paid for Lh e
services and assistance provided." 32 The T xas Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that "the expected payment doe not llave to be
monetary . . . . Chevron knew that Vortt furni shed the information
with the expectation that a joint operating agreement wouJd be reached.
The parties had negotiated for over four years trying to achieve that
end."33

Equity may also provide relief for one who enters into a burden som
contract. For example, in Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 3 4 equity
permitted a farmor to re cind a farrnout agreement. Dome Petroleum
farmed out to Atlas and Atlas drilled well s. Both Dome and Atlas knew
when they contracted that the Uptegrafts held a 2 percent leasehold
interest in the property. 35 After Atlas had obtained production from
30 787 S.W.2d 942, 108 0. & G.R. 126 ( 1990). Professor Kramer commented on this case
at 108 0. & G.R. 132.
31 787 S.W.2d at 943-944.
32 Id. at 944.
33 Id. at 945. Voru is subject to a sarcastic dissent by Justice Hecht:

Chevron's representatives never asked to sec the informutinn . Vo11t's repr.:sentative n1'.vc1·
told Chevron that Yortt expected anything in return . .. . [Ajbsolutely the only thing Vortt
expected to gain was favorable consideration of the proposed agreement .. . . The information
cost Vortt roughly $18,000. The trial court ordered Chevron to pay Vo11t $178,500 for it.
Was ever fainter hope more richly rewarded? For not refusing to look at Vortt's information,
Chevron must pay ten times its cost. The Court's ruling today should be a tremendous
encouragement to benefaction. A frustrated negotiator should never overlook this tactic in
attempting to induce agreement. The recipient of ~: ucl1 cliarity, however, should beware.

Id. at 945-946.
34 764 P.2d 1350, 102 0. & G.R. 557 (Okla. 1988).
35 764 P.2d at 1352.
(Mattliew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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two wells, Dome contacted the Uptegrafts and obtained their ratification of the farmout agreement. Dome did not inform the Uptegrafts
that there was already production on the tract. In fact, Dome's letter
to the Uptegrafts indicated that the advantages of the farmout agreement to Dome and its cotenants were "evaluation of production in
those units Atlas drills, and protection of leases which would have
expired before we could have drilled in this area." 36 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court based its decision upholding recission of the farmout
and assignments on the constructive fraud of Dome, as cotenant of
the Uptegrafts:
[C]o-tenants of an estate in land stand in a relation to each other of trust
and confidence and neither will be permitted to act in hostility to the other
in reference to the joint estate . . . . Under such circumstances it is not
improper to conclude that once the co-tenant decided to communicate with
his co-tenant recommending the execution of the farmout he was duty
bound to convey the whole truth. 37

Equity may also reinstate rights that have failed. In Hayes v. E. T.S.
Enterprises, lnc.,3a Pogo farmed out to E.T.S . While E.T.S. was
drilling, Pogo released the farmed-out lease. The court held that the
evidence established that the release was the result of a mistake, and
that when there is an execution of a release, rather than a negotiated
contract, a party may claim mistake to revoke the release unless
another party, in good faith, has relied on the release to its detriment. 39
36 Ibid.
37 764 P.2d at 1353. (citations omitted)
38 809 S.W.2d 652, 119 0. & G.R. 121 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991), writ denied. The author

commented on the case at Discussion Notes, 119 0 . & G.R. 137.
39 }-\aycs, the lessor, ~lnimed {I) that Pogo did nor mnke a mistake when executing the relense
because its ext:cmion wos intcntjonal and negligent, :md (2) that even i.f Pogo's cxecinion was
the resuh of a misu1ko, the uriilnteral mistake did not meet tbe requirements of "remedial mistake."
809 S.W.2d nt 654. The court of appeals first found that Pogo's release wns the result ofa. mistake
because the summury judgment evidence sho)lled tlmt the Pogo orficinl executing the release
would not have executed the release had he known of Pogo's farmout agreement with E.T.S.
There was also evidence thnt the officinl's execution of the release was due ton clerical error.
Id. at 655. 111e court nl ·o found thnt E.T.S . 's evidence in the fonn of deposition testimony of
Pogo's officials and employees satisfied the stricter summary judgment StMdard that applied
to an "interested wiLDess." If a witntl!;s is characterized as "interested," ns E.T.S.'s witnesses
were, then the evidence must be "clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from
contrndictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted ." Id. at 656. The
court rejected Hnycs' s claim that the requirements of the "rcmedin.I mistake'" rule must hove
been met for the court w resci nd the release, The "remedial mistake" rule would deny equitable
relfof unless ( I) the mistake is suc h that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionnble,
(2) the mismke relates to n material fcntui:e of the contrnct, (3) the mist.nkc occurred despite
ordi nnry cnn:, and (4) the prutics cun be en.~ily pluced back into the stru ns quo before the contraci.
(Mauhl.!W Bentler & Co. , Inc~)
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To similar effect is E'xxon Corp. v. Gann. 4 0 Gann purchased all of
Exxon's interest in a single well in Oklahoma, but a mistake in the
assignment and bill of sale resu lted in the transfer of two additional
wells. 4 1 Exxon sought reformat1on based on the doctrine of mutual
mistake. Gann contended that the re was no mutual mistake and that
the mistake was the result of Exxon's own negligence. 4 2 Both the
district court and the Tenth Circuit held that Gann intended to buy
only the one well. 4 3 The Tenth Circuit court refused to overturn the
district court's finding of fact, and also recognized that Oklahoma
courts have been reluctant to strictly constme the requirement that the
party seeking reformation must not have been negligent in forming
the contract. Oklahoma courts use a balancing test to determine if the
negligence involved rises to a level of "culpable negligence" that
violates a legal duty in order to bar reformation. 44
Equity may even protect one who has technically breached a
contract. In Crescent Drilling & Development, Inc. v. Sealexco, Inc., 4 5
the court upheld a trial court's application of estoppel and waiver to
award an investor an interest in a well drilled under a farmout
agreement, though the investor had failed to provide funds timely. 46
The facts showed that the company that held the interest had allowed
participants to make elections and payments late as a matter of course,
had in fact accepted and used the late payment, and owed the investor
amounts substantially in excess of the amount due. 47 To the same
effect is Waldron v. Zapata Exploration Company. 4 s There, Waldron
farmed out his interests in over 7 ,500 acres to Zapata Exploration,
which promised to pay $1.3 million and commence drilling by a
The court reasoned that the "'remedial mi 1:ike'" rnle relates only to negotiated contracts nnd not
to the unilmeral execution of n release. The court' s rarionale was that recission of a negotinted
contract would be inequitable unless the numbered requ.irements existed. However, when there
is a unilateral release mrher Limn a ucgotiutecl contract, a party only needs to show (I) that the
release was made as a result of a mistake, and (2) Ll1at another party in good faith did not rely
on the release to its detriment. Id. at 658-659.
40 2 1 F.3d 1002, 128 0. & G.R. 532 (10th Cir. 1994). Professor Maxwell commented on
the case at Discussion Notes. 128 0 . & G.R. 542.
41 21 F.3d at 1004.
42 Id. at 1005.
43 Id. at 1005- 1006.
44 Id. at 1006--1007.
45 570 So. 2d 151, I 13 0. & G.R. 82 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1990).
46 570 So. 2d al 155.
47 Ibid.
48 878 S.W.2d 349, 129 0 . & G.R. 565 (Tex. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).
(Matt.hew Bende r & Cu., Inc.)
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certain date. 49 Zapata failed to drill by the critical date and an
extension, but instead of suing, 5o Waldron encouraged Zapata to
continue searching for someone who would drill. Two years later the
well was finally drilled and resulted in a dry hole. Waldron then sued
Zapata for breach of the original farmout agreement. 51 The appeals
court found that the trial court properly submitted the issue of waiver
to the jury, which found that the plaintiff had waived any claim against
Zapata for breach of the promise to drill by the expiration date of the
Cockrell farmout agreement. 52
Equity may also impose liability, however. Dews v. Halliburton
Industries, Inc., 53 held that a farmee, who had assigned his interest
under a farmout agreement to another who then partially performed
by drilling the earning well, would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to claim the benefit of the well drilled by the assignee
without being obligated to pay the charges of the drilling and service
companies to which the assignee had defaulted. 54

[3]

Contract Interpretation.

The prevailing theme of farmout cases, however, is that the parties
to a transaction will be restricted to and bound by the explicit terms
of their agreement- that equitable principles will not apply to create
obligations that the contract does not address or vary those that it does.
Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp. 55 is an example. Aminoil owned
working interests in an offshore lease. When the lease operator
proposed a platform, Aminoil decided to farm out its interest to OKC.
Aminoil and OKC discussed Aminoil retaining an overriding royalty
that would be convertible on payout of the platform into a net profits
interest in the production from the platform. Aminoil and OKC even
exchanged written communication to that effect. But when Aminoil
drew up the farmout agreement, it contained a reservation of interest
49 878 S.W.2d at 350.
so Apparently the suit was for the cash payment. In Texas. one cannot recover damages for
nnother's failure to drill without showing 1hut 1he well would have been profitable. See Guardian
Trust v. Brothers. 59 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. -Eastland 1933), writ n:f'd. See also
the lllscossion at MU, N. 2 supra nt 8 12- 8 14 .
51 878 S.W .2(] ·at 350.
52 Id. at 351.
53
708 S.W .2d 67, 89 0. & G.R. 455 (Ark. 1986).
54
708 S.W.2d at 69.
55
812 F.2d 265, 98 0 . & G.R. 84 (5th Cir. 1987). Professor Martin commented on this case
.
in Discussion Notes, 98 o. & G.R. 93.
(MotUiew Bentler & Co., 1nc.)
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in the entire lease. 56 OKC reviewed the agreement for nearly five
weeks and then executed it. The trial court found that the lease was
unambiguous and that Aminoil had reserved an interest in the entire
lease. OKC argued for reformation under Louisiana law based on
mutual mistake of the parties. The Fifth Circuit Court held that OKC
could not show mutual mistake where the parties were experienced
in transactions of this type, 5 7 the agreement had been extensively
reviewed, the provision was central to the agreement, 58 the writing
was clear and unambiguous, 59 and there was no evidence that Aminoil
shared in the mistake. 60
A United States District Court in Kansas applied a similar analysis
in Amoco Production Co. v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 61 a dispute that
arose either because the parties did not understand their complex
agreement or because they did not administer it carefully. Amoco
farmed out to Hugoton ten drilling blocks, each of which included
Amoco's leases in nine sections.62 The contract provided for Hugoton
to earn assignments of Amoco's leases based on a complex scheme
of Exploratory Test Wells (ETWs) and Development Test Wells
(DTWs), and for Amoco to retain a 5.5 percent overriding royalty in
ETW s and 7 .5 percent overriding royalty and 20 percent back-in in
DTWs. 63 Hugoton drilled successful gas wells and received appropriate assignments, which triggered a "drilling clock" that limited
Hugoton's right to continue drilling. 64 Hugoton also drilled additional
56 The farmout provided for an ovcnid.ing royalty of 1/1 2 of 1/4 of 8/8ths of produclion until
net profits were rece.ived. the oveniding royalty convened into an cscalming net profits interest.
The net profits intcre t was specified to be 20 percent of the one quaner interest until recovery
ohhe first 4 million banels, and 33 percent the.reafter. Sec 812 S.W.2d at 267, n.3. TI1c agreement
st:1ted that the overriding royalty and es1mlnting net profits interest applied to "the lease." Id.
at 268, n.4.
57 812 F.2d at 276.
58 Id. at 277. The court stated th:1t the provision "goes to a significant purpose behind the
transaction."
59 Id. at 276. The coun held thnt the agreement wus "drafted in clear and simple temis, such
that even a rcadc.r with no expertise in oil and gas transactions could find it comprehensible."
60 Id. 111 278. The court found 1hat "t.he evidence clearly indicates a deli.berate decision on
the part of Aminoil, mid -way th.cough the drafting process, 10 reserve an overriding royalty
interest in production from the subjec1 lcru;c as distinguished from an interest in production from
PlaLfonn A."
61 11 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D.Kan. 1998).
62 Id. at 1272.
63 fd. at 1272-1274.
64 /d. at 1274-1275. The court described the drilling clock as a "use-it-or-lose-it provision."
Id. at 1274. It appears that Lhe provision was what was termed in SMU, N. 2 mpm at 775,
a "continuous restricted 01ition" designed 10 avoid or minimize Rev. Rul. 77-176.
(Matthew Dender & Co .. Inc.)
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development wells on the assigned acreage which did not meet the
contract definition of DTW, but the parties believed at the time that
the wells so qualified and treated them as DTWs. 65 Had the wells
qualified as DTWs, Amoco would have been entitled to a convertible
7 .5 percent overriding royalty. If they did not, Amoco retained only
a nonconvertible 5 .5 percent oven-iding royalty. 6 6 Amoco contended
that the subsequent conduct of the parties implied an agreement to
characterize the two wells as DTWs. 67 The court, however, could not
find the necessary intent to modify the contract, because the parties
were unaware that the contract needed to be modified. 6 8 Subsequent
conduct would have been helpful to interpret an ambiguous clause in
the contract, the court said, but neither of the parties asserted that the
contract was ambiguous. 69 Finally, Amoco argued that the contract
drilling clock had expired, if the two wells were not DTWs, resulting
in termination of Hugoton's right to drill additional wells. 10 The court
found that Amoco's claim amounted to an action for trespass, which
failed because Amoco had consented to the wells due to the court's
finding of consent. 71 Amoco in turn urged that its consent was negated
by mistake, but the court applied the Restatement rule that consent
is negated only if the trespasser was aware that the consenter was
mistaken; since both Amoco and Hugoton believed the wells to be
DTWs, Amoco's consent stood.
Puckett v. Oelze, 12 also reflects a strict-constructionist approach.
Puckett farmed out a lease covering a one-quarter mineral interest in
fifty acres to Oelze with the agreemen~ that Oelze would drill a test
well on a particular ten-acre tract. The farmout also specified that
Puckett would assign one-half of his interest in the lease to Oelze if
the well was not a dry hole and Puckett would receive one-eighth of
the working interest in the well and the spacing unit on which the
well was located. Oelze pooled the farmed-out ten acres with ten acres
from another well and drilled a successful well. Oelze maintained that
Puckett was entitled only to one-half of one-eighth of the working
65

11 F. Supp. 2d at l275.

6 6 tbid.
67
11 F . Supp. 2d at 1278.
68 tbid.

~9 I I

F. Supp. 2d at l 279.
JO Ibid.
1
; I I F. Supp. 2<1 at 1279- 12 80.
2
UI. A ~P · 3d 1020· 481 N.E.2tl 867, 87 0 . & G.R. 288 (l 985). Professor Kramer prepar •d !34 .,
& G.R. 297.
c a 0 lscuss1on Note m 87

o.

(Mn1thc.w Ilcnc.lcr &. Co., Inc.)
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interest, since the spacing unit was twenty acres, only ten of which
was from Puckett's lease. 73 The court held that the farmout agreement
was clear on its face, however, and awarded Puckett a one-eighth
working interest in the well and the twenty-acre spacing unit. The
Illinois court stated that "where the terms of the contract are plain
and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be ascertained solely
from the words of the contract." 74,
In Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc., 75 the court
rejected a claim of mutual mistake in upholding a summary judgment
enforcing the right of parties to an operating agreement to an interest
in a well drilled pursuant to a farmout agreement. 76 The farmout
agreement specifically provided that it was subject to the operating
agreement, but the farmee contended that the provision was included
by mutual mistake and asserted in support of its contention that none
of its employees had read the final version of the farmout agreement. 77
The court applied an Oklahoma statute 78 limiting reformation for
mistake to "mistakes not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the
part of the person making the mistake," concluding that "the mistake
alleged . . . was caused solely by the failure of [the farmee's]
representatives to read the farmout agreement."79
The terms of the farmout agreement may be important in determining whether equitable compensation may be available. Jn Petrocana
v. Margo, ao the farmor sought reimbursement for the fair market value
of geological data that it had furnished the fannee. 81 The court rejected
the claim, noting that it was "an attempt to state a cause of action
to recover damages for defendants' non-performance of the [option]
farmout agreement" inconsistent with the provision that the "only"
73 Puckett owned a 1/4 working interest in 1/2 of the drilling unit acreage. A "typical" farmout
arrangement is that the farmor contributes the lease, the farmee drills the well, and the farmor
and the farmcc share the working interest equally afte1• payout. See SMU. N. 2 supra at 763.
By this logic, one would have expected that Puckett would have been entitled to 1/16 of the
working int erest in the well. See SMU, N. 2 s11pra al 765-768.
74 481 N.E.2d at 871.
75 790 F.2d 828, 89 0. & G.R. 160 (10th Cir. 1986).
76 790 F.2d at 834.
77 Id. at 834-835.
78 Okla. Stat. Tit. 15, § 63 (1981).
79 790 F.2d at 825.
80 577 So. 2d 274, 276, 115 0. & G.R. 84 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) .
Bl 577 So. 2d at 278.
(MatLl1cw Bender & Co,. Inc.)
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penalty for nonperformance would be the forfeit of a cash payment
and the loss of a right to earn an interest. 82
Generally, however, the strict construction that most courts give
farmout agreements arises from the fact that disputes about farmout
agreements are "just business." They are disputes that arise out of
complicated and case-specific transactions lhat the parties choose to
structure. Courts have no particular expertise in reading between the
lines of farrnout agreements-nor do they have any particular interest.
§ 3.03.

Common Farmout Issues.

While there is no "model" form farmout contract, farmout agreements raise some common issues that cases surveyed address. In this
section of the article, developments relating to these substantive issues
are addressed.
[1]

Key Characteristics of Farmout Agreements.

There are five key characteristics of farmout agreements: (1) the
duty imposed: option or obligation, (2) the earning factor: produce
to earn or drill to earn, (3) the interest earned: divided or undivided,
(4) the number of wells: single or multiple well farmouts, and (5) the
form of the agreement: agreement to transfer or conditional assignment. s 3 A single dispute, which has occupied an inordinate amount
of time of Texas lawyers and Texas courts, illustrates the importance
that all of these factors may assume.

In Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., s4 commonly referred to as
"Ricane I," the Texas Supreme Court considered a Superior Oil
Company farmout of part of a lease to Western. One paragraph of
the present-assignment fannout agreement conditioned Western's
rights on commencement of drilling operations, while a second
paragraph required Western to perform all lease obligations:
"THIS ASSIGNMENT IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITION AND PROVISION:
82
Ibid. Professor Martin questions this reasoning at Discussion Notes, 115 0. & G.R. 99.
See the discussion of the problems of classifying farmout agreements as "obligation" or "option"
agreements at SMU, N. 2 s11pm nt 811.
3
: See S MU , N. 2 supra at 792-796.
4
772 S. W.ld 76, l 08 0 . & G.R. 331 (Tex. 1989). Professor Kramer commented on this
case in Discussion Notes, 108 O. & G.R. 340.
(Matthew Bender & co•. lnc.)
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J.
All of the right, title, interest and privileges herein conveyed to and
conferred apon Western will cease and terminate and shall revert
to and revest in Superior, unle s within thirty (30) day after the
date hereof Western shall commence the actual drillin g for oil and
gas apon the above described land and at a location thereon which
shall satisfy any then existing offset obligation

2.
Western shall and hereby does a sume and agree to perform and
discharge all of the [base] lease obligations, express or implied
. . . . To this end, it is recognized by the parties hereto . . . that
there now are a number of . . . off-set wells which Western hall
protect against by the drilling of propedy located wells on the above
described land, in due and proper time, and subject to all of the
applicable provisions of this agreement." 85
Western's well produced marginally and then was converted to a
di sposal we!~ but the lease was continued by production elsewhere
on the property. 8 6 Thereafter, neither the farmee nor any<>ne acting
in its behalf did a nything wit h the property for nearly twenty-three
years until after a prolifically-producing well was drilled on the
property by a subsequent assignee of the farmor. 87 The court of
appeals interpreted the language of the assignment as incorporating
the terms of lhe underlying oil and gas lease, 8 8 which required either
production or continuing operations to be maintained. 8 9 Thus, "upon
Western' complete ces ation of the use of the leased land for the
purpose of mineral exploration, development, and production, the
85 772 S.W.2d at 78.
86 /bid.

87 Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises. foe ., 775 S.W.2d 391 . 108 0 . & G.R. 322 (Tex. App.Amari ll o 1987). rev'd 772 S.W.2d 76, 108 0 . & G.R. 331 (Tex. 1989). In fact, Westem's
corpomte charter was canceled in 1965. nnd the person charged by the shareholders with the
respon ibili1y of settling the affairs of Western testified that it was hi intent to pay Lhe lnccmnl
Revenue Service and "ge1 1he hell om of Dodge." Rogers v. Ricune Enterprises. Inc.. 852 S. W.2d
751 , 130 0 . & G.R. 392 (Tex. App.- AmariUo 1993), rev'd 884 S.W.2d 763, LJO 0. & G.R.
415 (Tex. 1994).
88 The appeals court said that "a condition of the assignment was that . . . Western assume
and perform all obligations. express or implied, required by the underlying Dean lease. The
incorporation of the Dean lense into the assignmunt made the lease a part of Lbo assignmenl
and required their concurrent ope.ration . . . ," 775 S.W.2d at 394.
·
89 Id. at 392.
(Mat01cw Bender & Co., Inc.)

3- 15

FARMOUT AGREEMENTS LITIGATION

§ 3.03[1]

determinable fee it acquired by the assignment terminated." 9 0 The
Texas Supreme Court reversed. The supreme court agreed with the
court of appeals that the first paragraph of the assignment made drilling
the initial well a condition of earning, which Western had satisfied. 91
The supreme court reasoned, however, that if the farmee breached the
agreement, it breached its second paragraph, which was a covenant
rather than a condition:
In paragraph 2 of the assignment, Western simply agreed to perform
all the obligations of the base lease, express or implied. Since the
parties obviously knew how to create a condition in paragraph l,
the dissimilar language in paragraph 2 indicates that the parties
intended the latter paragraph to act as a covenant. We hold that
paragraph 2 is a covenant, not a condition, and that the court of
appeals erroneously read into paragraph 2 a condition on the estate
conveyed. 92
Thus, if the farmor had a claim it was for damages, rather than for
lease termination. The court also reaffirmed Texas law that an oil and
gas lease-or a lease assignment- transfers an interest in real property
that cannot be abandoned. 93
On remand, the trial court jury found for the defendants, on
reasoning that set up another round of appeals. The jury concluded
that the Rogers group, the descendants and assigns of the Western
shareholders, had abandoned the purposes for which the assignment
was made. 94 The court of appeals upheld the jury's take-nothing award
on the basis of an implied special limitation of devotion to purpose
articulated in what it described as the "hoary case"95 of Texas Co.
v. Davis. 96 Again, however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, this
time in a 5-to-4 decision. In Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 9 7
which is referred to as "Ricane II," the Texas Supreme Court stated
the doctrine of Davis to be:
Davis stands, therefore, for the proposition of law that, if the expressed
purpose of the lease is the production of minerals, and the grantee "entirely
90 Id. at 395.
91 Ricane I, N. 84 supra, 772 S.W.2d at 79.
92 tbid.
93 772 S.W.2d at 80.
94 852 S .W.2d at 759.
95 Id. at 756.
96
254 S.W . 304 (fex. 1923) .
97
. 884 S.W.2d 763. 130 0. & G.R. 41 5 (Tex. 1994). Professor Kramer commented in
Discussion Notes, 130 O. & G.R. 429.
(Manhcw D!!ndcr & Cu.. Inc,)
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and permanently stopped and abandoned the exploration and development"
of the property in question, then the estate terminates at once and title
reverts to the grantor. 98

The court then essentially limited Davis to its facts by refusing to
imply a drilling purpose in the farmout assignment. 99 Quoting Ricane
I, the court said that "the language used by the parties . . . will not
be held to impose a special limitation on the grant unless it is clear
and precise and so unequivocal that it can be given no other meaning." loo Further, the court concluded that even were it to imply a
drilling purpose in the assignment, the proper remedy for the breach
of an implied covenant in a lease is an action for breach of that implied
covenant, or a conditional decree of cancellation allowing the parties
to fulfill the covenant, and not cancellation of the lease. 101
The Ricane cases are impo1tant and interesting. First, the cases are
great instructional tools, because the facts underlying Ricane I and
Ricane II illustrate several of the distinctions made in this author's
SMU paper. The Ricane farmout is a classic illustration of a drill-toearn, divided interest, single well conditional assignment farmout
agreement. It was a drill to earn, divided interest and single well
farmout because Western obtained its rights in a separate part of a
larger lease by drilling a well, not by completing a well capable of
producing in paying quantities.102 And Western obtained a conditional
assignment of its interest before it performed, rather than an assignment after it had drilled the earning well. Second, Ricane I underscores
the distinction between conditions and covenants in farmout agreements. As the Texas Supreme Court held, the farmout agreement made
additional operations a promise, rather than a condition of Western' s
continued ownership. Third, the Ricane cases make absolutely clear
that a mineral or leasehold interest in Texas is an estate in land that
may not be terminated by abandonment, but they leave Texas without
a common Jaw doctrine to clear old clouded titles. 103
98 Id. at 766, citing 254 S.W. at 309.
99 Id. at 767. The Davis lease contained a specific statement that the conveyance was made
for "the purpose of drilling, mining, and operating for minerals." 254 S.W. at 305.
100 884 S.W.2d at 767, citing 772 S.W.2d at 79.
101 Id. at 767-768.
102 Apparently, however, the well Western drilled was capable of producing in paying
quantities though it produced only marginally, because it was drilled in 1949 and not converted
to a disposal well until 1961. 775 S.W.2d at 392.
103 The issue of what ought to be the law-whether the fee simple determinable estate created
by a lease or farmout agreement ought to be subject to an implied limitation of devotion to
(Matthew Bender & Co .. Inc. )
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The Form of the Agreement: Agreement to Transfer or
Conditional Assignment.

Farmout agreements traditionally have taken the form either of an
agreement to convey or a conditional assignment. The essential
difference in the two is the point in time when the farmee acquires
an interest in the farmed-out property. Under an agreement to convey
form, the farmee obtains its rights only when (and if) it performs the
conditions of the contract. Under a conditional assignment farmout,
the farmee obtains an interest in the farmed-out property when the
agreement is made, subject to an obligation to reconvey or to automatic
termination if the conditions subsequent are not performed. 104
The farmout's form may have enormous practical significance to
the parties' rights and liabilities. Farmors generally prefer an agreement-to transfer form, because that structure permits a farmor to retain
title until the farmee performs. Farmees generally prefer conditional
assignments because they get title immediately.1os
Recent cases tend to confirm the general preferences of farmors and
farmees. Farmors have somewhat more protection against liens with
an agreement-to-transfer farmout structure than with a conditionalassignment structure because the farmee has no present right to the
property at the time the work is done, which may prevent a lien from
attaching. Several of the recent cases involved assertion of mechanics
liens and the technicalities of the various states' lien statutes. In Noble
Exploration, Inc. v. Nixon Drilling Co., Inc., 10s a Texas Court of
purpose--excited a great deal of attention. The author assisted some members of the Ricane
group in preparing their briefs supporting the existence of an implied limitation. Professors
Williams and Shade also filed amict1s briefs in suppo11. Professor Homer filed an amicus brief
against. One of the author's students criticized the deci sion in Ricane II. See Vangelisti, 19 Tex.
St. Bar Sec. Rep.: Oil, Gas & Mineral Law 4 ( 1995). Professor Kramer suggested that the matter
should be left to the legislature. See Discussion Notes. 130 0. & G.R. 429, 431-432.
104 See, e.g., Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29. 31-34, 7 0. & G.R. I 177
( 1957) (automatic termination) (the subject of comment by Professor Masterson at Discussion
Notes, 7 0 . & G.R. 1183); Mengden v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643, 647---{i49, 55 0.
& G .R. 477 (Tex. 1976) (obligation to reassign) . Some writers do not consider conditional
assignments or, as they are also called, Term Assig11me11ts, to be true farmout agreements. See,
e.g. Haworth, "Farmouts and Term Assignments-Anatomy 101," Paper 6, 39th Ann . Inst. for
Prof. Landmen (Southwestern Lg!. Fnd. 1998).
lOS See generally the discu.ssion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 796. These practical considerations
may be overridden by the tax advantages of the conditional-assignment farmout in situations
m which the formo ut agreement covers "outside" acreage. See generally SMU, N. 2 supra at
773-775.
106

794 S.W.2d 589, 114 0. & G.R. 160 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990). The author commented
in Discussion Notes, 114 O. & G.R. 168.
(Mallh~w BcmJer & Co., Im;,)
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Appeals held that a drilling contractor hired by a farrnec under an
agreement-to-assigu farmout was not entitled to a mechanics lien
against the farmor's leasehold interest in the absence of proof of an
express or implied contract between the drilling contractor and the
farmor or its agent. 101 Amoco Production Company v. Harwell
Energy, Inc., 108 reached that result under Louisana law.109 There, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a contractor hired by a farmee
to drill the earning well in return for an interest in the well was not
entilled to a mechanics lien against the farmor' s property under
Louisiana law becaus the interest that the drilling contractor was due
did not constitute an "amount due" under the lien statute. 110 In Dews
v. Halliburton Industries, /nc.,111 the Arkansas Supreme Court re~
versed a trial court's impo ·ition of statutory liens against both the
farmor and farmee because of inadequate notice.112 It also relea ed
equitable liens the trial court had imposed on all the fund held by
the production purchaser because "at the lime the work was pe rformed
.. , [the farmee] did not have an interest i.n production." 113
107 The keys to this decision were ( l) the terms of the statute and (2) rh coun's finding
that the farmout ogreement was not -properly placed in evidence. The T<Ixas lien statu1e, Tex.
Prop. Code Ann. § 56.001(2), limits liens against mineral propenics to those who meet 1he
definition of " mineral contrm..ior," a person who renders SCl"Vicc or provides materials "under
an express or implied contract with n mineral property owner or with a trustee. ngent. or receiver
of a mineral property owner." Tbe court reasoned that, because the formout agreement had not
been introduced at trial, it could not be considered in the appeal l)ven I.hough it had been attached
lo the plaintirrs pleadings. Moreover, the fact 1hat the written farmout agreement existed,
precluded a finding of an implied contract. 794 S.W.2d nt 592. Texas courts do not nppeor to
have decided squarely whether o fnnnout agreement establishes the timnec ns an agem of the
farmor for purposes of the lien statute, and the court's cvidcntinry ruling avoided that issue in
this case. Logic suggests that the validity of liens asserted by c:onLrnctors again ta farmor should
be determined by the precise terms of the farmout agreement and the foc1ual circumstances.
For example, it would be easier to describe a fannec as the agent of a farmor for lien purposes
if lhe formouL agreement made drilijng an obligation of the fannee, rather thnn an option. In
lhe mosl common situn1ion, however, where the fnnnout 11greemc111 makes drilJing an option
of the frurnec, the scope of o contrnclor's lien wiJI probably be limited to whatever interest the
farmee earns.
108969 F.2d 146, 120 0 . & G.R. 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
109 Amoco 's fannout to HorwcU Energy provided that, if ihe well was completed as a producer, and Horwcll complied with certain other lenns of the agn,oemcnt, Amoco would assign
Horwell an 80 percent interest in the well. In turn, Horwell contmcted with Gardcs Directional
Drilling to drill and complete the well. Horwell agreed to assign Gardes pm1 of the interest it
was to cam from Amoco. Gardes drilled, but Hornoell breached its agreement with Amoco, which
elec1ed to terminate the formou1, so Horwe ll could not perfonn its promise to ass ign. Thereafter,
Gnrdes filed a lien agninst Amoco. 969 F.2d at 147.
110 Id. at 148, citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:4861(A).
111 708 S.W.2d 67, 89 0 . & G.R. 455 (Ark. 1986).
112 708 S.W.2d at 70.
113 Ibid.
(Ma1~1ew
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Other recent cases arc likely to confirm fam1ees' preference for the
conditional-assignment form of farmout. In Moncrief v. The Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co., 11 4 the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded
that a farmee had no right to vote the interests covered by an
agreement-to-transfer farmout in a consent/nonconsent election under
a unit operating agreement. The court reasoned that acreage must be
counted as consenting or nonconsenting at the expiration of the
election period, at which time the farmee did not have a binding
agreement. 11 5 The court rejected the argument that the time at which
the farmee had to control the farmor' s interest was the spudding of
the well and that the doctrine of equitable conversion operated to vest
the farmee with the farmor' s rights at that moment. 116 In Beavers v.
Kaiser, 11 7 however, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a
farmee that had performed its option to drill and complete a well under
an agreement-to-assign farmout acquired equitable rights that related
back to the date the farmout was given. 11s
A case decided since the author's SMU article written in 1987,
however, underscores how important it is that the conditional assignment be properly structured. In Riley v. Meriwether, 119 lease farmors
sought a declaratory judgment that an assigned interest had terminated .
The conditional assignment provided that it would terminate either if
a new well was not commenced within ninety days after the cessation
of the drilling program or if there was no gas production within sixty
days after the last well was completed. There was no production from
or operations on the property for thirteen months. The assignment did
not provide for shut-in royalty payments, though the leases subject
to the assignment contained shut-in royalty clauses and shut-in
royalties had been tendered to the lessors. A jury found that the
assignors had waived their rights to complain. The trial cou1t set aside
114

861 P.2d 516. 127 0. & G.R. 406 (Wyo. 1993). Professor Geraud criticized the case
in Discussion Notes, 127 o. & G.R. 433.
115 861 P.2d at 527-528.
116

lrJ. nt 525--526. The opinion is lengthy, lhc facts are complicated. and the reasoni ng of
the court is hazy. The -case is ihe subject of Discussion Notes al 127 0 . & G.R. 433 by Professor
Geroud, nnd n comment in Anderson, " Recent Developments in Nonrcgulatory Oil 1md Gns Law,"
·IS~~ ~ii &. Gcis In.st. Ch. I (Matthew Bentler 1994).
us 537 N.W.2d 653, 134 0 . & G.R. 239 (N.D . 1995).
537 N. W .2d nt 656-657. The case is the subject of n Discussion Note by Professor Anderson at 134 0. & G .R. 248 .
119

780 S.W.2d 919, 111 0 . & G.R. 336 (Tex. App .--El Paso 1989), writ denied. The author
commented on this case at Discussion Notes, 111 O. & G.R. 348, and this text is based on that
comment.
.

(M atthew Bender & Cn 1..,. \
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the jury's finding of waiver and held that the assignee's estate had
terminated under the terms of the assignment. i20 On appeal, the court
rejected the assignees' argument that a clause in the assignment that
"reference[d] for all purposes . . . the oil and gas leases described
in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference"
incorporated the underlying leases-and their shut-in royalty
clauses-in the assignment. The court of appeals concluded that the
quoted language merely referenced the exhibit as a description of the
leases. 121 Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, the assignment created
a fee simple determinable in the assignee that had terminated automatically as a matter of law when production ceased and the grace periods
provided in the assignment ran. 122 The assignees could not "bootstrap"
the lease shut-in royalty and notice clauses, 123 and waiver did not
apply because the assignment had terminated as a matter of law . 124
The law applied by the court is well-established in Texas, as well
as in many other states. The assignment provided for a term for as
long as "oil or gas . . . are produced." It conveyed a fee simple
determinable interest that terminated when there was no "production,"
either actual or constructive. By definition, in Texas, a shut-in well
is not "producing," and the assignment contained no shut-in clause
or notice-and-demand clause to provide constructive production. If the
estate created by the assignment is to be held by constructive production, the assignment must contain a complete set of provisions for
constructive production.125

[3]

Failure of Title.

Farmout agreements customarily impose the risk of title failure on
the farmee. 126 Only rarely does a farmout agreement warrant the
120780 S.W.2d at 921.
121 Id. al 924. The court's

interpretation of the clause in the coO'ected assignment that the
assignment "reference[d] for a ll purposes . . . the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A
attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference" is hard to follow, but is technically
correct. It is a general rule of grammar that a restricting clause qualifies only its nearest
antecedent; thus, the phrase "incorporated herein by this reference" modifies "Exhibit A," not
"the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A."
122 Id. at 923.
123 Id. at 924-925.
124 Id. at 923.
125 See also Archer County v . Webb, 161 Tex. 210, 338 S.W. 2d 435, 13 0. & G.R. 280
(1960) (commented on by Professor Maxwell in Discussion Notes, 13 0 . & G.R. 29 1). and the
commentary at J Kuntz, The Law of Oil and Gas § 15.8 (1987).
126 Sec the discussion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 798.
(Mattl1ew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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farmor's title. A recent New Mexico case makes representations nearly
the equivalent of warranties, however, in appropriate circumstances.
In Strata Production Co. v. Mercury Exploration Cu., 121 Mercury
represented in a fa1mout agreement, but did not warrant, that it owned
or controlled J 00 percent of the working interest in the farmed-out
acreage.128 In fact, Mercury owned Jess than l 00 percent, and Strata
sued Mercury for the value of the difference. Because Strata had paid
no independent consideration for the farmout and because Strata
learned of the problem before it commenced performance, Mercury
argued that Strata had waived the representation.129 The New Mexico
Supreme Court characterized the farmout agreement as an offer for
a unilateral contract running from the farmor to the farmee, to be
accepted by commencement of performance, but held that the agreement had become binding by virtue of promissory estoppel even before
Strata commenced drilling. Promissory estoppel arose, the court held,
from the fact that Strata drilled the first well on the prospect in reliance
on Mercury's representation, although that well was not located on
the farmed-out acreage. 130 The court also rejected M ercury' s assertion
that it had no liability because it had only agreed to "assign to Strata
100% of Mercury's interest."131 Because New Mexico has rejected
the strict, "four-corners approach to contract interpretation and instead
allowed courts to consider extrinsic evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement to determine if
contract terms are in fact ambiguous," 132 the court looked to deposition and trial testimony to conclude that there was substantial evidence
that Mercury had in fact promised to assign 100 percent of the working
interest to Strata. 133
127 121 N.M. 622, 916 P.2d 822, 133 0 . & G.R. 85 (1996).

128 916 P.2d at 825.
129 Id. al 826.
130 Id. at 828-829. Further, the court held that promissory estoppel applied even though Strnta's reliance was not <lctrirm:ntal, since the lirst well was a very good well. /cl. at 829.
131 Id. ut 830.
132 [bid.
133
916 P.2d at 831. The court :ilso held 1tia1 1hough the fannet: had sold most of i i~ interest
i n •he prospect to inve stors who were not p;u1ies to 1hc ac!ion, th<: farmcc was en ti lled 10 I 00
percent of the damages because the farrnout was be Iween Mercury and Strata and there was
no privily of contract between the investo rs and Mercury. Id. ac 83 1-832. Further, the court
nppenred to adopt the "lost royahy" rule a~ the mcnsure of damages for breach of a drilling
coruract. Ir/. at 832-833. Sec also the d iscussion at SMU. N. 2 supra at Sl2··8 14.
.

lM•tlhcw l\en~cr & Co. lnc.)
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\.l\frH "Com1uiew..:cmo1t"

Farrnout agreernenl cornmencemcnt-of-drilli11g prov1s1ons vaiy
widely .134 In their dealings with one another, however, people in the
oil and gas business are likely to seek more precision than is offered
by oil and gas lease language that commonly requires mere "commenc~ernent of operations" or "commencement of drilling"-terms
which are generally given very liberal interpretation by the courts.1 35

In farmout agreements, the requirement more frequently is that the
farmee "commence the actual drilling" of a well or that a well be
"spudded." Both terms are commonly understood to be intended to
require a drill bit to have pierced the ground.

A recent federal case from Mississippi illustrates how impo1tant
word variation may be in drafting commencement provisions in
farmout agreements. In Exxon Corporation v. Crosby- Mississippi
Resources, Ltd., 13 "; an exploration agreement continuous-drilling
provision allowed a I 80-day gap between completion of an exploratory
well and "actual commencement of drilling" of a development well. 137
The Fifth Circuit Court upheld a lower court's ruling that the contract
term was ambiguous and that drilling "actually commenced" when a
small truck-mounted drilling rig began drilling for the installation of
conductor pipe.138 The court reasoned that "creation of the conductor
pipe hole was part and parcel of the actual drilling process, and was
more than preparatory activity, such as the gathering of equipment
or the clearing of land." 139
Neomar Resources, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation 14 0 also
teaches a drafting lesson, one particularly important in farmouts of
property on which wells have been drilled previously. There, the court
held that a fannee could not maintain a claim against the farmor and
134 See the discussion at
135 See generally Kuntz,

SMU, N. 2 supra at 802-803.
Lowe, Anderson, Smith, and Pierce, Cases and Materials 011 Oil
and Gas !,aw 176--180 (3rd ed. West 1998).
136 154 F.3d 202 (5th Cir, 1998).
137 Id. at 206, n.8.
138 Id. at 207. Conductor pipe is installed to prevent the borehole from caving in under the
weight of the drilling rig. After its installation, the remaining drilling work is performed through
the conductor pipe.
139 Id. at 208. The court also referred, apparently with approval, to the district court's
conclusion that if the parties had meant that only the use of a larger drilling rig would satisfy
the "commencement of actual drilling" language, they could have used language to that effect
in the contract. Id. at 207 .
140 648 So. 2d 1066, 132 0. & G.R. 613 (La. !st Cir. 1994).
(Mnuhcw Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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its assignee for failing to permit the farmee to use a nonproducing
hole drilled to a deeper formation, which caused the farmee to have
to spend millions of dollars to drill a twin well. The court noted that
the farmout agreement did not give the farmee an express right to use
the borehole. 141 It rejected the argument that the reasonable prudent
operator standard implied the duty, because that duty runs from a
Jessee to a lessor, not to the lessee's assignee. The court also rejected
the argument that the refusal violated public policy against waste and
inefficiency, noting that, if such a cause of action existed the right
would lie with the state, not the farmee. 142 Finally-and this is the
most important drafting point made by the case-the court stated that
it did not accept the farmee's argument that a lessee or farmee was
always entitled to use improvements on the land.143

[5]

Objective Depth.

The "objective depth," or the "contract depth" as it is sometimes
called, is the depth that the farmee must drill under the terms of the
farmout agreement in order to earn its interest under that agreement.
Objective depth usually is described either by reference to the number
of feet to be drilled or by description of the formation to be explored.
Either may cause interpretive difficulties. 144
The meaning of "objective depth" was at issue in Arleth v. FreeportMcMoran Oil & Gas Co. 145 Freeport drilled a well to the 15,900'
sand, allegedly discovered the "Mother Lode," but could not complete
because of mechanical problems.146 Subsequently, Freeport agreed
with the Arleth group 147 to drill an additional well and "in the event
that . . . the well . . . is not completed as a commercial producer
· · · after reaching the well's objective depth in a straight hole
configuration, then . . . [Freeport] shall attempt to sidetrack the well
· · ·to .. . [the 15,900' sand]."148 Freeport drilled to within 100 feet
of the 15,900' sand, but refused to sidetrack the well because the well
was a commercial producer at the shallower depth. Later, Freeport
141 648 So. 2d at 1068.
14 2 Ibid.
143 648 So. 2d at 1069.
144 For funher discussion, see SMU, N. 2 supra at 805-808.
145 2 F.3d 630. 128 0. & 0 .R. 62 (5th Cir. 1993), relr 'g tlc11ied 9 F.3d I 05 (5th Cir. 1993).
146 2 F.J d. al 632.
147 Arleth is not, strictly speaking, a farmouts case. The letter agreement arose out of a corporate merger. Id. at 631 .
148 Id. at 633.
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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drilled its own offset well to the deeper sand and obtained prolific
production. 149 The investors sued, and a federal district court found
Freeport liable for more than $9 million for securities fraud, breach
of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.1 5 0 On appeal, Freeport argued that the letter agreement was
ambiguous and that its reference to the well' s "objective depth" meant
the measured depths that would permit production from any of the
three formations in which commercial production had been encountered. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the
agreement unambiguously obligated Freeport to drill "two alternative
configurations" to the J5,900' sand. 151
Without the full text of the letter agreement, one cannot evaluate
the ambiguous/unambiguous debate that took place in Arleth. Clearly,
however, the language could have been better structured. Clearly, as
well, the dispute might have been avoided by well-chosen prefatory
statements of purpose.152

[6]

Nonopcrating Interests Reserved.

Farmors usually reserve a nonoperating interest in production from
the earning well or wells during the payout period. Usually, the interest
reserved is in the form of an overriding royalty interest.153 A recurring
problem is what duty, if any, the farmee owes to the farmor to protect
the nonoperating interest. Specific issues include the "washout problem"- whether the overriding royalty or production payment owner
is protected if the lease on which the nonoperating interest is based
is permitted to terminate, after which the property is re-leased by the
operating rights owner.

[a] The "Washout" Problem.
The "washout" problem arises whether the lease transfer is pursuant
to a farmout agreement or a "straight" assignment, though this
discussion will be limited to those cases involving farmout agreements. 154 If the transferee permits the lease to terminate and then
149 /bid.
150 2 F.3d at 632.
151 /d. at 634.
152 See the discussion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 790.
153 See the discussion at SMU, N. 2 supra at 829- 832.
154 The broader issue might well be the subject of a separate article at one of these institutes.
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.)
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subsequently re-leases the property, should the original lessee's
nonoperating interest be recognized under the new lease? Not affording the original lessee such protection tempts assignees to wash out
nonoperating interests to increase the assignees' profits. But it is basic
oil and gas law that an overriding royalty interest is limited in duration
to the life of the leasehold interest, because the overriding royalty is
carved out of the leasehold interest. By definition, then, termination
of the leasehold interest extinguishes the overriding royalty. In
addition, there may be sound business reasons for an assignee to permit
a lease to terminate and then re-lease the property. In most states, the
implied protections against washout are limited to nonexistent. l55
In Matter of GHR Energy Corp., 156 the Fifth Circuit applied Texas
law to deny protection to an overriding royalty owner. Medallion Oil
Company acquired overriding royalty interests in property farmed out
by El Paso Natural Gas Company to TransAmerican Natural Gas
Corporation, as a finders fee. Subsequently, TransAmerican settled a
gas contract take-or-pay judgment against El Paso by terminating all
agreements between the companies and accepting an assignment of
El Paso's mineral interest. 157 Medallion contended that its overriding
royalties were still valid, but the court rejected its claims, relying on
prevailing Texas law 158 and on language in TransAmerican' s assignment to Medallion that specifically allowed TransAmerican to terminate its lease interests at will.159 The court noted in dicta, however,
that "it might well reach a different result if the facts here had
suggested that TransAmerican surrendered its interest in the lease to
destroy the rights of the overriding royalty interest owner." 160
Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye 161 applied similar principles to a royalty
interest in a Colombian coal license. The licensee assigned the license
to Marathon in return for cash and an overriding royalty interest. 162
155 Ney, Note,"Protecting Overriding Royalty Interests in Oil and Gas Leases: Arc the Courts
Moving to Washout Extension or Renewal Clauses?," 31 Washburn L.J. 544 (1992).
156 972 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied 979 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507
U.S. 1042, 113 S. Ct. 1879, 123 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1993).
157 972 F.2d at 98.
158 Id. at 99.
15 9 Ibid.
160 972 F.2d at 101.
161

893 S.W.2d 585, 130 0. & G.R. 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994). The author commented
on the case at 130 0. & G.R. 657.
162 893 S.W.2d at 588. The court described the interest as a "nonparticipating royalty." In
the oil and gas industry, an interest of this kind would ordinarily be called an overriding royalty,
even though it was carved out of a contractual license for a term of years, rather than out of
an estate in land.
{Malthcw Bender & Co., Inc.)
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When the Colombian government nationalized the coal industry,
Marathon relinquished the licenses. 16 3 The royalty owner contended
that Marathon owed it a fiduciary obligation to protect its interests. 164
A Texas court of appeals held that no fiduciary duty was created by
the license assignment and the reservation of the royalty interest. 165
A federal court upheld an arbitration award that protected a farmor
against washout, however, in In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
Asamera Ltd. and Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 166 Asamera's predecessor
entered into a Technical Assistance Contract (TAC) with the Indonesian state-owned oil company, Pertamina, in 1968. The TAC was
limited to twenty years but contained a statement that a request for
extension would be given "sympathetic consideration" by Pertamina.
Pursuant to a farmout agreement that stated it would be governed by
Texas law, Asamera assigned two areas covered by the TAC to Tesoro
and retained an overriding royalty. In 1989, after the 1968 TAC had
terminated, Tesoro entered into its own TAC with Pertamina covering
the farm out areas, retroactive to the date the 1968 TAC expired. Tesoro
then stopped paying Asamera the overriding royalty and Asamera
maintained that the royalty continued under the new TAC. In an
American Arbitration Association proceeding, the arbitrators agreed
with Asamera. 167
Tesoro argued that since the overriding royalty was carved out of
the 1968 TAC, it must terminate when the TAC terminated-that
Asamera could acquire "no greater estate" than the 1968 TAC
created. 168 The arbitrators, however, reasoned that the TAC was a
contract to produce oil and gas, not a lease governed by Texas property
law, so that the "no greater estate" principle did not apply.1&9 The
1988 TAC was therefore subject to Asamera' s overriding royalty even
though the farmout of the 1968 TAC did not contain the explicit
language that would have been necessary to attain this result under
Texas property law. The district court confirmed the arbitration award
on the grounds that the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded
Texas law.110
163 /bid.

164 839

S.W.2d at 592.

165 /bid.
166 807 F. Supp. ll65 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

167 Id.

at 1166.

168 /d. at 1167. The author testified for Tesoro as an expert on Texas oil and gas law.

169 /d.
170 Id.

at 1168.
at 1169.
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Extension and Renewal Provisions.

As a result of the uncertainty whether a lessee who transfers
operating rights in a lease will be protected against a washout and
when such protection will be extended, lease assignments reserving
nonoperating interests frequently contain extension and renewal
provisions guaranteeing recognition of the transferor's nonoperating
interest in lease extensions and renewals. 1 71 In GHR Energy Corp.,
the extension and renewal provision simply was not broad enough.
It stated that the overriding royalty "shall also apply, extend to and
include each and every renewal or extension of an oil and gas lease
covered by this Assignment which is acquired by [TransAmerican],
directly or indirectly, prior to or within one (I) year of the expiration
or termination of said oil and gas lease." 172 In the event that led to
the dispute, TransAmerican terminated the underlying lease and
acquired the mineral estate.
The root of these problems, of course, is conceptual. If an oil and
gas lease is regarded as a conveyance of an interest in real property,
as it is in most states, then it is not possible either to extend or renew
it. The issue then becomes when is a new grant closely enough related
to the initial conveyance that the parties would have regarded it as
an "extension or renewal"? That, of course, is usually determined by
the language of the clause. Incomplete or imprecise drafting often adds
to the difficulties.
171 An example of an extension and renewal clause follows:

This [resen:a1ion, gra11t, conveyance, etc.] shall apply as well to all modifications, extensions
and renewals of the supporting lease, or any part thereof, by the lessee , his successors and
ass igns, or nny sublessee. h.is successors und assigns. " Renewals" sbalJ includCl wholly new
leases made by any of these persons wi1hin [30, 60, 90, etc.] days after the lapse of curren t
lease coverage. The terms of this paragraph shall be con tmctuaJly ope.r:uive as a pn.o of nJ I
mollilicmion, extensio n nnd reuewnl leases as well ns rhe current lease. If subject to the Rule
against Pe rpetu ities, this effect shall be treate<l as wholly lnpsed and without effect
commencing one day before the muximurn interval pennitted by the Rule.
Lowe, 7 Wes1's Tews Forms§ 11 . 11 ( d ed. West 1997). Stntute , ns well as the common law
or the ngree rneat of the pnrtics. may offer a rarrnor protection. Jn Col umbia NaturnJ Resources
Y. Tatum, 58 F. d 11 0 1, 137 . & G.R. J2R (6th Cir. 1995). a United States Court of Appeals
held th at nll cgat.ions that tht: de fe ndants n.llowed or caused Columbia's farmed-out leases to
termi11n10 so Ihm defendants could enter into new oil nod gas leases with the lessors constituted
n claim lhut Colurnbi.a might pursue under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Orga"izn.tions
Ar.a (R ICO .
172

GHR Energy Corp., N. 156 supra, 972 F .2d at 99 (e mphasi s added).
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Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc. 173 illustrates another
common problem with an extension and renewal clause in the context
of a farmout agreement-the problem of privity. Robinson assigned
a lease to North American Royalties with a reservation of an overriding
royalty. The assignment contained an extension and renewal clause
that provided that the overriding royalty would also apply to any future
lease acquired by North American, its successors or assigns, that
covered any portion of the same property if it was acquired within
one year of the expiration of the present lease.174 North American
in turn entered a farrnout agreement with Stone Oil Corp. Stone drilled
a successful well and North American assigned that portion of the lease
containing the producing well, subject to Robinson's overriding
royalty. Stone next drilled a dry hole outside of the assigned area and
then allowed the remainder of the lease to expire. Soon after the lease
expired, Stone entered a new lease with the lessors.175 Robinson
argued that the anti-washout clause applied to the new lease and was
therefore subject to his overriding royalty interest. The Louisiana Court
of Appeals held that Stone was not contractually bound under the
Mineral Code 176 unless it drilled a successful well and received an
assignment. There was privity of contract between Stone and Robinson
only for that portion of the lease that Stone was actually assigned.177
[c]

Reassignment Clauses.

An alternative protection for a nonoperating interest owner is to
obligate the transferee to offer to reassign the lease before permitting
the lease to terminate. Typically, such a provision is referred to as
a reassignment clause. 178 Reassignment clauses too may present
enforcement problems because of drafting inadequacies.
173 463 So. 2d 1384, 84 0. & G.R. 281 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985), 011 remand 509 So. 2d
679, 95 0. & G.R. 292 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). Professor Martin commented on these decisions
in Discussion Notes, 84 0. & G.R. 292 and 95 0. & G.R. 304.
174 463 So. 2d at 1385.
175 Ibid.
176 The court interpreted Article 128 of the Mineral Code as legislatively overrnling the sublease/assignment distinction and imposing a statutory privily of contract between a sublessor
and a sublessee and the sublessee's assignee.
177 463 So. 2d at 1388.
178 An example of a reassignment clause follows:
In the event that Assignee shou ld elect to sunender, let expire or tenninate, abandon or release
any of his rights in said lease acreage, or any part thereof, assignee shall notify Assignor
not less than thirty (30) days in advance of such surrender, expiration or termination,
abandonment or release and, if requested to do so by Assignor, the Assignee shall immediately
(Mallhcw
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Eland Energy, Inc. v. Rowden Oil & Gas, Inc. 17 9 illustrates the
point, though the drafter was vindicated. In Eland, the farmor and the
farmee executed a farmout agreement that stipulated that the farmor
would assign the farmee forty acres in the form of a square as nearly
as possible around each producing we ll the farmee completed. T he
agreement also provided th at it was binding on all partie and their
heirs, successors and assigns, but not assignable without the farmee' s
written consent. Subsequently, the farmor ass igned the entire property
to the farmee, subject to the terms of the original farmout agreement,
to avoid the burden of numerous assignments of individual forty-acre
tracts. In tum, the farmee agreed to continuously develop the lease
and to assign back to the farmor any undeveloped portions when all
drilling ceased. 180 Several years later, the farrnee assigned undivided
interests in the lease to his children, specifically "subject to any
re servations, limitations or burdens effecting [sic] said leases." 181
Eventually, Eland acquired the interest of one of the farmor's children .
Eland claimed an undivided one-third interest both in the forty-acre
tracts around producing wells and in the undeveloped acreage of the
entire farmout property . The farmer's successors in interest sought
specific performance of the reassignment provision. The trial court
found that Eland had obtained its interest subject to all of the terms
of the farmout, including the reassignment obligation, and granted
summary judgment for the farmor' s successors.1s2 On appeal, Eland
raised several reasons why summary judgment was improper.
Eland claimed that the reassignment claims were barred by the fouryear statute of limirations relating to contracts to convey land. The
court of appeals swept all of Eland's objection aside, however. The
court concluded that because the assignment of the entire lease to the
farmee was made subject to the farrnout and the reassignment obligation it contained, the assignment transferred only legal title. The
farmee obtained equitable title to lease property only by earning it
by drilling wells, and the legal and equitable titles merged when the
reass ign such rights in said lease acreage, or such part thereof, to Assign or. Such renssignment
shall be free and cl ear of all lease burdens, overrides and payments out of prod uction in excess
of or in addition lo those that existed at the date of the original assignment.
Lowe, 7 Wes1 's Texas Forms§ 11.12 (3d ed. West 1997).
179
914 S.W.2d 179, 137 0. & G.R. 130 (Tex. App.- San Antonio 1995). This author has
commented on the case in Discussion Notes, 137 0. & G.R. 147.
180 Id. at 182.
181 Id. at 183.
182 Id. at 184.
(Matthe w Bender & Cn .. lnc \
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forty-acre tracts were des ignated. tB3 The suit was therefore a qui et
title action l1l)I subje t to auy statute of limitations. I 8 4 Eland additionally contended that the vagueness of the description of the land to be
conveyed pursuant to the farmout caused the stalute of frauds 10 bar
any obligation to rea ·sign unearned acreage; the phraseology was "40
acres in the form of a square as nearly as possible," and no one knew
at the time of the assignment what portions would be reassigned
because no one knew where the wells would be located. The appellate
court concluded that the farmee's right to designate, coupled with his
interest in doing so, satisfied the statute of frauds. Finally, the court
noted that some of the owners of the farmee' s interest had already
designated the tracts.1ss

Ricane II, 186 discussed at Section 3.03(1 ], above, also illustrates
the difficulty of structuring language in a reassignment clause that will
fit the occasjon . There, the farmee corporation did not honor the
reassignment clause, and instead went out of business and dissolved.
The successors to the farmor argued in vain that the farmee' s rights
has nonetheless terminated. is1
Indeed, the biggest problem with reassignment clauses may be that
they will be enforced in situations in which the lease assignee or
farmee do not expect them to be. 188 In Shore Exploration & Production Corp. v. Exxon Co1p., 189 Shore assigned leases to Exxon, Texaco
183 Id. at 185.
184 Id. at 186.
185 The Ela11d nnnlysis is an example of whilt hns bec11 cnl lcd the" eller's selection clause
exception" to the sia1u1e of frnuds. Jame v. NICO Energy Corp .• !!38 F.2d 1365. 1369, n.3,
102 0 . & G.R. 352 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to apply Ilic cxccplion to an option "to pnrric.ipnte
in subsequent wells on an additionnl 700 acres (npprnximntely) to be de ignrued by Nico from
ncreagc which it presently bas under lease" (Id. at 1368, n.2) n irrelevant to !he dispute before
it). Id. at I 69, n.3 (discus cd by the n1nhor in Discussion Notes, 102 O. & G.R.. 368). "[T]hc
statute of frauds is met where tile contract, instrument or agreement, gives either party the
unqualified rigbt or power to make a selection or dctem1inntion of the details without the necessity
of further agreement or approval of the other puny." Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W. 2d 185, 7 0 .
& G.R. 15 13 (Tex. Civ. App. -Texarkana 1957) (cormncnted on by Profes or Mnstcrson in
Discussion Notes, 7 0. & G .R. 152 1). The tract from which the selection is to be made must
be described with reasonable cenainty, however. Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex.
1973).
186 Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc .. 884 S.W.2d 763, 130 0. & G.R. 4 15 (Tex. 1994).
187 884 S.W.2d at 765.
188 In "The Reassignment Provision-·Mcaningful or Not?." 20 Rocky Mtn. Mi11. L. Ills/. 60 1,
623 ( 1975), Paul W. Eaton, Jr. aptly descl'ibcd the reassignment clnuse as "a vicious, vengeful
dog ready to bite the unwary person who ignores it."
189 976 F. Supp. 514. 139 0 . & G.R. 406 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
(Mattl1cw Bender & Co., Inc.)
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and Eastern reserving an overriding royalty in separate transactions.
The agreements to assign required the assignees to pay delay rentals
or to notify Shore of its intention not to pay, so that Shore could
request reassignment. 190 Subsequently, Texaco acquired the interests
of the other assignees and entered into an agreement with Shore
ratifying Shore's overriding royalty and incorporating the terms of the
Exxon and Texaco agreements with Eastern to assign, but not the
Eastern assignments. 1 91 After drilling several dry holes, Texaco
assigned the leases, covering over 82,000 acres and subject to Shore's
overriding royalty and the reassignment clause, to Eastern. Eastern
neither paid the rentals nor gave the notice required by the reassignment clause. All of the leases were forfeited for failure to pay delay
rentals. 192 Shore then sued Exxon, Texaco and Eastern for damages.
Texaco asked for summary judgment that it was not liable because
it no longer owned an interest in the leases when the failure to provide
notice occurred. The court found Texaco liable, on a theory of privity
of contract, for Eastern's failure to give notice regarding the leases
Texaco had acquired directly from Shore and the leases assigned by
Exxon to Texaco, which had been the subject of the Texaco/Shore
ratification. 193 The court granted Texaco's motion, however, with
respect to the leases that Texaco had acquired from Eastern and then
reassigned to Eastern, finding that an area of mutual interest (AMI)
agreement between Texaco and Shore did not establish contractual
privity l94 and that, while the reassignment provision was a covenant
190 The Texaco/Shore reassignment provision provided that:
Should Texaco elect not to pay delay rental s on lease(s) .. . in which Shore has only an
overriding royalty interest, Texaco shall first notify any party who owns a working interest
in such lease or leases of its intention to surrender said lease or leases by non-payment of
delay rentals. If the other working interest owner(s) elect not to pay the delay rental(s), Texaco
shall then advise Shore of its intent to release such lease(s) and Shore shall have the right
to make such payment(s) and Texaco shall assign its interest in said lease(s) to Shore. Texaco
shall give Shore thirty (30) days advance notice of its intention not to make such delay rentals.
Shore shall advise Texaco whether it wishes to make said delay rental payments within fifteen
(15) days of receipt of notice. Failure to timely respond shall be considered an election by
Shore not to make such payment(s). Texaco shall have no liability to Shore for failure to
offer any lcase(s) to Shore, provided such failure is not the result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Texaco agrees that it will furnish Shore each month with copies of rental receipts
as proof of rental payments being made on lease(s) during the preceding month.
976 F. Supp. at 524.
191 Id. at 521.
192 /d. at 519-520.
193 Id. at 521-522.
194
Id. at 522. Shore argued that the AMI clause controlled all subsequent leasehold interests
(Mauhcw BcnJcr & Co.' lnc.)
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running with the fond, Texaco was no longer in privity of estate with
Shore. 195
Probably the simplest way for a farmee to avoid liability after
assignment of lands subject to a prior reassignment obligation is to
provide in the reassignment clause itself that it will be relieved of
liability after an assignment. 19 6 Merely providing that assignments
may be made only with the farmor's approval (perhaps with the
stipulation that approval would not be ui1reasonably withheld) does
not necessarily relieve the original promisor of liability on the basis
of privity of contract.197 Perhaps because it had foreseen the possibility of a situation such as it confronted, Texaco had included in its
reassignment agreement with Shore a provision that "Texaco shall
have no liability to Shore for failure to offer any lease(s) to Shore,
provided such failure is not the result of gross negligence or willful
misconduct." 198 That limitation did not protect Texaco, however, for
the court held that neither Texaco's notices to Shore that the leases
were being assigned to Eastern nor Texaco's request that Eastern
"handle" the problem of lease default rose to the level of "slight
diligence" or "scant care" necessary to avoid gross negligence. 199

[7]

"Payout" Under Farmout Agreements.

Farmout agreements almost always provide that the farmee will
"carry" the farmor in drilling operations under the agreement-Le.,
that the farmee will pay all of the expenses of drilling operations. Tax
rules200 and business realities201 require that the farmor postpone
acquired by Texaco in the AMI area, including the Eastern leases when they were assigned to
Texaco. The court disagreed, reading the contract provision as not being "intended to apply to
every lease into which Shore and Texaco thereafter entered." Ibid.
195 976 F. Supp. at 524.
196 Something like "provided, however, that in the event of assignment of this property in
whole or in part, liability for the breach of any obligation hereunder shall rest exclusively upon
the owner of this property, or po1tion hereof, who commits such brcach"-a clause found in
many oil and gas leases-should suffice.
197 Texaco made a similar argument in the Shore case, urging that Shore's consent to Texaco's
release of certain leases indicated its agreement to release Texaco from the reassignment
obligations relating to the retained leases. The comt noted the general rule that an "obligor
remains liable for performance of a contractual obligation even after an assignment." 976 F.
Supp. at 525.
198 Id. at 524.
199 Id. at 525-526.
200 The contributions of property and cash or se!'lices by the farmor and farmee are treated
as a "sharing arrangement" or a pooling of capital, a tax-free transfer to forrn a new economic
(MatU1cw Bender & Co .. Inc.)
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sharing any operating rights in the farmed-out property with the farmee
until after "payout." The period from when the well is drilled and
completed until the farrnee has recouped its drilling and development
costs, as well as its operating costs durfog that period, is generally
called the "payout" period. A typical farmout agreement arrangement
gives the farmor a nonoperating interest in production- usually an
overriding royalty interest- until "payout." After "payout," the farmor's interest may be convertible at the farmor's option, or convert
automatically, to a share of the working interest.20 2
Because "payout" may have great economic importance to both the
fannor and the farmee, it is small wonder that the parties often disagree
about what the term means in particular circumstances. 203 Several
cases turned up in this survey shed light on payout issues, though not
all of them arose directly in the context of a farmout agreement.
As observed elsewhere, "what specific costs and revenues are
considered in calculating complete payout should be determined by
the directness of their relationship to the asset; costs and revenues that
can be directly related to the earning well should be considered in
calculating payout."204 The additional cases encountered in this survey
are generally consistent with that analysis . In Aminoil USA, Inc. v.
OKC Corporation,205 the court held that interest and legal fees relating
venture, rather than as a sale of property or services . See the di scussion at SMU, N. 2 supra
at 765-768.

201 The

Fifth Circuit has described a "carried interest" as follows:

In any carried interest transaction, one of the owners of the working interest in property is
willing to advance the funds necessary for drilling of wells and development of production
of oil or gas, and to look only to the other owner' s share of production for the other owner' s
contribution to such costs. The party who puts up the money is called the carrying party
because he risks his entire investment against the possibility that there will not be enough
production to reimburse him for his costs. The other party is called the carried party because
he. t~kes no risks. The carried party agrees to wait until the carrying party has recouped his
dnlhng and development costs out of production before he takes any payments on his share.
The carried party is not personally liable for any costs and loses nothing if there is no
production.

~nited Sintes v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433. 436 (5th Cir. 1968),
1
26~8'., 2.2 L. Ed , 2d 455.' .3 1 0 . & G.R. 605 (1_969).

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922, 89 S.
.
1 yp1cnl payo ut prov1S1ons effective ly permit the farmce to convert its expenditures on
behalf of the r
. .
.
llrl1lor s interest to a nonrecourse lotu1 recoverable out of the farinor' s shnrc of
~~o~~~twn. Polevoi, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Transactions§ 8.05[3)[c] (Matthew Bender

203

The nu1hor wrote at length about thi s issue at Lowe , "The Meaning of ' Payout ' in Oil
Farrnout Agreements," 10th Ea.rteni Mill. L. inst. 13-1 (Matthew Bender 1989).
Id, at 13- 2.0.
205 629
F. Supp. 647, 90 0. & G.R. 234 (E.D. La. 1986).

an~ 0~ 5
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to a dispute between the farmor and the farmee over the extent of the
farmor' s retained ownership interests could not properly be charged
in determining "payout" under a farmout agreement. The court
observed that the agreement did not provide for interest on the
farmee's costs,205 nor was it permitted by generally accepted accounting principles. 201 The court held also that the farmout agreement's
reference to legal costs to be charged to the net profits account did
not include costs related to disputes between the parties, such as the
one before it. 2o8 An analogous analysis is provided by [( rafve v.
O'Keeffe,209 where a court applied a common-sense interpretation of
a poorly-drafted stock-for-working-interest agreement to hold that
"payout" was to be determined by taking into account only costs
incurred in producing revenue from the two mineral properties farmed
out, rather than all general expenses of the operator.210 In addition,
in Burg v. Ruby Drilling Company, lnc.,211 the Wyoming Supreme
Court held that losses incmTed by a farmee as a result of a fire that
destroyed some of its equipment could not be recovered as operating
costs under a farmout agreement, when the agreement required the
farmee to obtain insurance and the farmee had failed to do it. 212
The most interesting and problematic additional "payout" case
encountered in this survey is Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben Oil
Corp. 21 3 There, a farmee obligated by a multiple-well farmout
agreement to account quarterly214 to the farmor went bankrupt, and
206 629 F. Supp. at 650--651.
207 Id. at 651.
208 Id. at 654. The court quoted the testimony of an expert witness that he knew of no occasion
where legal expenses arising from a dispute between the parties to the farmout agreement had
been charged as an operating expense. Ibid.
209 753 S.W.2d 220, 103 0. & G.R. 633 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988), writ. denied. Professor
Kramer commented on the case in Discussion Notes, 103 0 . & G.R. 647.
210 753 S.W.2d at 222. The contract defined "payout," which was the event that triggered
the shareholder's option to trade corporate stock for producing interests, as the time "when the
amount of production revenue attributable to O'Keeffe's interest shall equal O'Keeffe's pro rata
share of the corporation's outstanding liabilities as of November 30, 1981, plus the sum of all
ordinary, necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by the corporation in producing the income
during the period." Id. at 220.
211 783 P.2d 144, 109 0. & G.R. 360 (Wyo. 1989). Professor Geraud commented on the
case at Discussion Notes, 109 0. & G.R. 383.
212 783 P.2d at 153-154.
213 976 F.2d 614, 121 0. & G.R. 250 (10th Cir. 1992). Professor Kuntz commented on the
case at Discussion Notes, 121 0. & G.R. 264.
214 The accountings were to show the amount expended to date, the amount received to date
and the balance left till payout. 976 F.2d at 614.
(Matthew Bender & Co., tnc.)
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fifteen years passed before the farmor' s assignee, Howell, realized that
it might have valuable rights and sought an accounting. Howell tried
to avoid its obvious problems with the statute of limitations 21 5 by
arguing alternatively that the farmout agreement made the accounting
obligation either a covenant that continued as long as any of the wells
subject to the farmout agreement remained in production or a covenant
running with the land. The court of appeals rejected both arguments
because of what it described as the "plain language" of the contract
that limited its maximum term to four years and because neither
Howell nor its predecessor had demanded an accounting after the
contract's termination. 216
One may question the analysis of the Howell court. The farmout
agreement provided merely that it "shall remain in existence for a
maximum period of four (4) years,"217 which does not plainly state
the intention of the parties that the accounting obligation end with the
farmout agreement. Indeed, the parties must have known at the time
they drafted the farmout agreement that payout of all the wells drilled
might not have been attained within four years. A more defensible
interpretation of a payout provision was given by the Texas Court of
Appeals in Cummins and Walker Oil Co., Inc. v. Smith. 218 There the
court held that the statute of limitations on an agreement to assign
a portion of a working interest after payout began to run only after
payout had occurred, because the facts that constituted the cause of
action did not exist until then. 219
Another analysis inconsistent with Howell was applied in North
Finn v. Cook. 220 There, Cook farmed out portions of a mineral rights
lease to Kelly Oil and Gas Co. The farmout provided that Cook would
assign Kelly the working interest in a forty-acre drillsite on completion
of a well capable of producing in pay ing quanti ties. The farmout also
reserved Cook an overriding royalty and provided that "following
payout . . . , Cook shall be reassigned by Farmee, a fully participating
215 The Lri11J court applied Okl ahoma's five-year statute of limilations for written contracts,

*

Okla. Stal. tit. 12, 95, to deny Howell relief. 976 F.2d at 618.
216 976 F.2d at 6 19.
217 Id. at 618.

218 814 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. A.pp.---San Antonio 199 1).
219 Id. at 887. Cummins rmd Walker did not involve a

fnrmout agrcemen!, bu! intcrprc ied
u compensatio n ugrecrncnt for oil company cmplllyecs. T he analys is is obviously re levant ro
formo11r ugrcements. howcvo.r.
?.20 825 F. Supp. 278, 125 0 . & G.R. 6 13 (D. Wyo, 1993). Professor Geraud commented
on the cusc in Di[>cussion Notes. 125 O. & G.R . 626.
(Mau.hew Bender & Cu,, lnl:,)
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thirty percent (30%) backin (sic) working interest in the Test Well." 221
Kelly drilled two wells, 011e of which was capable of producing in
paying quantities, and Cook assigned a forty-acre location to Kelly.
Kelly failed to pay the costs of drilling the wells and Kelly's property
interests were foreclosed. North Finn purchased the foreclosed property at a sheriff's sale 222 and contended that Cook's interests were
cut off as a personal covenant between Cook and Kelly. 22 3 The
Wyoming district court characterized Cook's back-in interest as a
possibility of reverter triggered by "payout" that could not be cut off
by a foreclosure sale, despite North Finn's argument that the interest
could not be a possibility of reverter because it was not automatic-the
agreement provided that the fam1ee would reassign the interest. 224 The
court stated that "the provision requiring reassignment by the farmee
will be enforced by the Court following payout, if it occurs, as a
formality signalling (sic) that reversion has occurred."225
Howell teaches two lessons, however. First, it suggests that a
fannout agreement should be worded specifically to make the accounting obligation an obligation that will survive the termination or
expiration of the agreement. 226 Second, the case shows the importance
of administering one's agreements-the court's interpretation of the
contract language might well have been different had the original
farmee been more diligent: in demanding accounting statements. 221

221 825 F. Supp. at 28 l.
222 Id. at 280.
223 Id. at 281.
224 Id. at 282.
225 Ibid. The court also refused

to allow statutory liens to attach to the farmor' s retained
interest, holding that under the Wyoming statutory scheme no liens could attach to the farmor
without a contract stating that the farmor will assume responsibility for the costs . 825 F. Supp.
at 283.
226 The importance of s pecific language, at least in Oklahoma, is underscored by the fate
of Howell's claim for an equitable accounting . The district court denied the claim because Howell
had shown no proof that any amount was owed Howell. Id. at 620. The Tenth Circuit court
agreed with this interpretation of Oklahoma law. Ibid. Thi s left Howell in never-never land.
Without an accounting there was no proof and without proof there would be no accounting.
227 The need for dilige nce in asse11ing one's rights is also illustrated by KMI Continental
Offshore Production Co. v. ACF Petroleum Co., 746 S.W.2d 238, 104 0 . & G.R. 133 (Tex.
App. -Houston [I st Dist.) 1987), writ denied, where the court applied Iaches to bar the exercise
of an option to purchase which was to be exercised within ninety days of payout, because the
information as to when payout occurred was in the control of the plaintiffs. Id. at 244. The court
observed that "the wells and land involved are oil and gas property, which is inherently
speculative. The longer one delays in acting on an option concerni ng oil and gas property, the
easier one is able to speculate on the value of the property at the other's expense." Id. at 244--245.
Professor Homer commented on the case at 104 0. & G.R. 147.
(Mattl1ew Bender & Co .. Int,)
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Operating Agreements/Unit Agreement.

Farmout agreements often incorporate operating agreements or unit
agreements, either by attaching them or by reference. 22s What happens, however, if the fannee does not execute the agreements referenced? In Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas
Co., 229 the Supreme Court of Utah held that a fact issue existed as
to whether parties who executed a farmout agreement that provided
in part that "by your acceptance of this Agreement you agree to adopt,
ratify and confirm the plan of unitization and Operating Agreement
. . . . " became bound by the unit agreements so as to be subject to
a 300 percent penalty for not participating in a development well. 230
Again, one sees the importance of precise words.

[9]

Lease Payments.

One of the impmtant administrative problems that most farmout
agreements address is whether the farmor or the farmee is to make
payments that may come due under the farmed-out leases. The most
common structure provides that the farmor will make all payments
until the earned interest is assigned, subject to total or partial reimbursement by the farmee. This structure usually makes administrative
sense because of the efficiencies of having the farmor, who already
has the farmed-out properties enrolled in its administrative system,
handle the payments.231 Imperial Oil of North Dakota, Inc. v.
Consolidated Crude Oil Co., 232 however, illustrates a risk to the
farmee of relying on the farmor. In Imperial Oil, the North Dakota
Supreme Court upheld an order of lease cancellation for failure to pay
royalties e ven though the lmpaid royalties amounted to slightly more
than $12,000 and the lessee's forfeiture loss would be approximately
$691,000. 233 ~urther, tbe court held that the farmees of portions of
the lessee' interests were not ind is pen able parties to the suit. 234 The
228 s
ee SMU, N. 2 ,1·11pm at 838.
229
899 P.2d 766. 132 0. & G.R. 202 (Utah 1995).
230

899 P.2d at 768-769.

2 31
SMU, N. 2 .wpru nt 839-840.
232
85 1 F.2d 206. 100 0 . & G.R. 554 (Bth Cir. 1988).
233

lo

ry

85 J F.2d nL2 10. North Dakota's srntutory scheme allows cuncellati on of n lcnsc for fnilure
roynJti l!s. N.D. Cont. Code §. 47- 16--39. l (Supp . 1985).
34 Id. at 211.
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farmees therefore lost their entire interests in the leased property
without notice of the farmor' s failure to pay. 235

Imperial Oil may turn on the failure of the farmees to record their
assignments, though the court did not mention that factor. It may also
be that the assignments in Imperial Oil were unusually worded; the
court observed that "the assignees . . . were not parties to the leases
. . . the assignees were merely assigned an interest in [the farmor's]
rights under the leases."236 But if the farmees were assigned undivided
interests in the farmed-out leases and recorded those interests, they
should have been considered to be indispensable parties to the
cancellation action.

In addition, of course, Imperial Oil is unusual because lease
cancellation for failure to pay royalty is a remedy available in only
a few states. Cambridge Oil Co. v. lfuggins 2 37 is a more representative
decision. There, a farmee failed to make timely royalty payments,
breaching an amendment to a fannout agreement that gave a royalty
owner the right to "terminate the agreement" for nonpayment of
royalty. 238 The court held that the language did not justify canceling
assignments that the farmee had previously received to property
surrounding producing oil wells because "courts will not declare a
forfeiture unless they are compelled to do so by language which can
be construed in no other way."239 The court also rejected the royalty
owner's contention that the farmout agreement amendment imposed
fiduciary obligations on the farmee because the farmee had agreed
to pay royalties "with more propriety than in the past," 24 0 distinguishing Manges v. Guerra, 241 on the ground that in Manges, the benefits
received by the Guerras depended solely on Manges's management,
while "here . . . the relationship was strictly contractual." 242
235 As noted in SMU, N. 2 supra at 840, a related issue is what liability, if any, the farmor
has to the farmee if loss of title results from the farmor's failure to make lease payments properly.
Farmout agreements usually disclaim any liability by the party hruidling the payments.
236 851 F.2d at 211.
237 765 S.W.2d 540, I 06 0. & G.R. 318 (Tex . App.-Corpus Christi 1989), writ denied.
The case is the subject of a Discussion Note by Professor Homer at 106 0 . & G.R . 328.
238 765 S.W.2d at 542.
239 Id. at 543.
240 Id. at 542.
241 673 S.W.2d 180. 80 0. & G.R. 561 (Tex. 1984).
242 765 S.W.2d at 544.
(Matthew Bender & Co .• Inc.)
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Conclusion.

As this author observed in 1987, farmors' and farmees' mutual
interest in maximizing available tax benefits causes the structure of
farmout agreements to be very much the same, or at least fall into
discernable patterns. 243 Farmout substantive provisions, however, vary
widely . The difference in substantive provisions results in part from
the different goals that farmors and farmees seek when they enter into
agreements . 24 4 In part, the differences are reflexive; once one encounters a problem, one drafts to avoid it in the future. In part, also, the
differences show the creativity of American businessmen and their
lawyers in deal-making. "Only the creativity of businessmen and their
lawyers limits the variety of provisions that may be included in a
farm out agreement." 245
But surely the cases reviewed in th is article illustrate that the
transactional costs of drafting, administering and litigating farmout
agreements is high . Farmout agreements are susceptible to orderly
analysis, and over the years many distinguished commentators have
written to suggest particular approaches to that analysis .246 Is it not
time for t he industry and its lawyers to try again to develop model
fonns?247
243 See SMU , N. 2 supra at 765- 778.
244 Id. at 778-782.
245 Id. at 867.
246 See id. nt 760, n.3, ror II pnrt inl list.
247 The AAPL has prepared a "model" form , AAPL
has not gain<.'d wide acceptance.
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Form 635, but it is so skeletal that it

